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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YETZI~~N H. DE~j[QOR, 
Plaintiff' aud Respondent, 
-YS.-
PAlTL Pi\ULUS and FOGG AND 
BRADY FURNITURE CO~f-
p i\NY., a lT tah Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9941 
BRIEF o~F APPELLANT 
ST.A.TEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for property damage sus-
tained in the collision of two vehicles in Ogden City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found for the plaintiff, awarding 
damages for Yehic.Ie repairs and loss of use. 
N~\.TURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judg1nent entered 
in the lower court. 
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STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
This case involves a motor vehicle collision which 
occurred on 1\tlay 19, 1961, at 2017 South Washington 
Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. Defendant Paul Paulus 'vas 
in the process of moving a large van-type truck, o\vned by 
Defendant, Fogg and Brady Furniture Company, from a 
parked position on the west curb line of Washington 
Boulevard into a southerly course of travel on Washing-
ton Boulevard when a collision occurred involving the 
left front bumper of defendant's vehicle and the right 
side of plaintiff's vehicle. The weather was clear and 
the pavement dry. The time was approximately 7:10p.m. 
For illustrative purposes the following diagram 
is submitted: 
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The Defendant testified that he had "·aited for the 
southbound traffic on Washington Boulevard to clear 
and then had proceeded into Washington Boulevard at 
an angle which was necessitated by vehicles being 
parked to his front and to his rear. (R. 25) Defendant 
further testified he did not see Plaintiff until Plaintiff 
was approximately two car lengths away, at \vhich time 
the Defendant immediately stopped his vehicle and the 
collision occurred. (R. 25) 
The damage to the Plaintiff's vehicle was de-
scribed by Plaintiff (R-20) as being a "gash" along 
the right side of his vehicle. The damage began at the 
front of the right front door and continued along the 
entire right side to the rear of Plaintiff's vehicle. The 
only damage to Defendant's vehicle was a slightly bent 
front bumper. 
Plaintiff testified that he had been traveling east 
on 20th Street and had made a right turn where 20th 
Street intersects with Washington Boulevard. Plain-
tiff testified (R-16) that as he rounded the turn he 
observed Defendant's truck moving away from the curb 
at 2017 South Washington Boulevard. 2017 South Wash-
ington Boulevard is approximatley 150 feet South (R-8) 
of the south curb line of 20th Street. 
Plaintiff further testified (R-12) that as he observed 
the Defendant's truck moving away from the curb he 
moved his vehicle over next to the lane line which sepa-
rates the inside and outside lane for southbound traffic. 
Plaintiff testified (R-16) : 
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'' ... \~ far as I \ra~ concerned that took rare of the 
\\·holt• matter. 1 had given the truck enough room 
to proceed and go 011 his \vay and then as I kept 
on going I suddenly rcnlized that this just \vasn 't 
going to \vork, I realized at the last second, this 
truck, he kept on going at an angle to,vards the 
lane in \vhich I ,,·as driving, ho,vever, for me it 
,,.aR too late to stop." 
Under cross-examination Plaintiff testified (R-18}, 
'~I had given the Defendant enough room and as far as 
I thought ~lr. Paulus was going to go in making his angle 
out and go on his 'vay south on Washington Boule Yard.', 
Plaintiff testified that Defendant gave no indication 
he was a"·are of Plaintiff's presence. Plaintiff did not 
sound a \varning of his approach. ( R-18) 
'• Q. Did ~[r. Paulus give you any indication that he 
had seen you. 
1\. He did not. There 'vas no turn signals, no 
nothing. 
Q. And did you sound your horn. 
i\. I had no reason to.'' 
Plaintiff did not move to the inside lane. (R-19) 
• 'Q. .A.nd it 'vould have been possible for you to 
have moved over into the inside lane and have 
a voided this collision . 
. :\. l ... es, sir, I could ha.v-e gone clear over to the 
other side of the road too, but there was no rea-
son for me to do that. I had taken every pre-
caution to avoid the accident and I didn't even 
expect an accident because I had given him all 
the room he had needed.'' 
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Plaintiff then continued on and a collision occurred 
at a point approximately 20 feet East of the west curb 
line of Washington Boulevard. (R-6) 
Defendant testified that his vehicle was stopped at 
the moment of the impact (R-23). Plaintiff testified that 
both vehicles were moving at the time of the rollision 
and that the impact made both vehicles stop. ( R-20) 
However, Plaintiff testified in answer to the next ques-
tion that his vehicle traveled approximately a car length 
after the impact. 
"Q. Mr. Paulus had actually come to a stop hy the 
time you collided with him, had he not~ 
A. Well, he was going very slowly. I think the im-
pact made both of us stop. 
Q. How far did your car continue to travel after 
the first part of the impact~ 
A. A car length I guess, I bounced off his 
bumper.'' 
Plaintiff admitted (R-13) that he was traveling 
about twenty-five miles per hour. 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBU-
TORILY NEGLIGENT AS A 11:ATTER OF 
LAW AND THAT SUCH CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR 
CONTRIBUTED TO THE COLLISION. 
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rrhe rrrial Court held that the Defendant failed to 
prove that Plaintiff \vas contributorily negligent. The 
flpfpJulant submits that the evidence in the record, con-
strued most favorably to the Plaintiff, discloses con-
durt hy the Plaintiff that is clearly below the standard 
of rare to \\·hirh Plaintiff is required to conform for his 
O\Vn proteetion. The Defendant further submits that 
rca~onable minds could not differ thereon, that Plaintiff 
did not aet as a reasonable man of ordinary prudence 
under like circumstances should have acted. 
This appeal presents two basic questions. Did the 
Plaintiff have a duty to avoid the collision? If Plaintiff 
did have a duty to avoid the collision, did Plaintiff act 
with due care to avoid the collision? 
Plaintiff entered Washington Blvd., a four-lane 
high,vay that traverses Ogden's business district, from a 
street controlled by a traffic semaphore. Plaintiff testi-
fied that he saw Defendant's truck, a large van-type 
truck, moving into the outer traffic lane from its parking 
place at the curb, as he rounded the corner and began to 
proceed south on Washington Blvd. (T-12) 
Plaintiff testified that he moved from his position in 
the curb to side portion of the outer lane toward the in-
ner lane, because he had observed Defendant's truck 
leaving the curb zone and proceeding into the outer lane 
of traffic. (T-12) The direct or casual relationship be-
tween Plaintiff's observation of Defendant's truck and 
Plaintiff's immediate movement from the curb side 
('vest) of the outer lane to the inner extremes of the 
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outer lane is testified to by the Plaintiff on both di rPd 
examination (T-12) and cross-examination (T-16). The 
outer south-bound lane of the four-lane highv{a:· \ras 
t\venty-four feet four inches, and the inner south-bonlld 
lane \Vas ten feet eight inches (T-10). Despite Plaintiff'~ 
original shift in position \\Tithin the outer lanr, \rhi('ll 
clearly seems to have been a reaction to the entrance of 
Defendant's truck into that lane, Plaintiff did not moYr 
into the inside lane, though he could have done so '':ith-
out endangering himself or others, since a red light had 
stopped the flow of traffic along Washington Blvd. at that 
time. 
Defendant is willing to concede that, as a general 
proposition or rule of la,v, a driver has a right to assume 
that another driver \vill obey the la\Y and act \Yith due 
care. (See 38 Am. Jur. NEGLIGENCE, Sec. 192, p. 871). 
However, courts have placed a very significant limitation 
on this rule. This limitation denies a driver the right to 
assume due care by others when such driver has, or ought 
to have, knowledge of circumstances indicating that thr 
other motorist is not exercising due care for his own and 
others' safety. (See 38 A1n. Jur. NEGLIGEXCE, Sec. 
192, p. 871.) This rule of la,,~, with its limitation, has 
been recognized by this court in numerous decisions 
(See: Martin v. Sterens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747 ~ 
Bullock t~. Luke, 98 lTtah 501, 98 P. 2d 350; Lawder Y. 
Hallen, 120 Utah 231, 233 P. 2d 350; and Bates Y. 
Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P. 2d 209.) 
In Conklin v. 1Valsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d 437, 
this Court held that a "favored" driver's right to as-
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~ume thnt other drivers 'vill exercise due care does not 
substitute for the "favored'' driYer 's duty to maintain 
a propPr lookout. 
In Utah, after Conklin, a driYer's right to assume 
due rare on the part of others terminates when an alert 
dri,·Pr 'vould have recognized the danger. 
This court has indicated at various times that it 
,vill charge a driver with knowledge of a danger that he 
would have seen if he had exercised due care in ob-
~Pr\·ing the driving situation. (See: Martin v. Stevens, 
supra; and Bates Y. Burns, supra.) 
When a driver has actual or constructive knowl-
Pdg-t\ of circumstances reasonably indicating that an-
other driver is not acting with due care, then the as-
sumption that others 'vill exercise due care terminates 
and the alerted driver has the duty to act reasonably 
under the circumstances to avoid a collision. 
It would seem reasonable to conclude that Plain-
tiff, based on his reaction to the appearance of Defend-
ant ·s truck on the highway, was alerted to the danger 
po~E.'d by the truck. Plaintiff's own admissions would 
justify this conclusion {T-12) (T-16). 
Once ''alerted'' to the conduct of the Defendant 
and of potential danger from such conduct, the Plain-
tiff cannot argue that he is entitled to the position of 
an unaware motorist. Rather, with a realization of the 
danger created by Defendant's angular entry, Plain-
tiff is compelled to act 'vith due care to avoid a collision. 
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Plaintiff had many alternative courses of action 
available to him that would have avoided the colli~io11. 
He could have stopped entirely. He could have reduced 
his speed until he determined where Defendant's vehicle 
was going to turn from its angular course to the south. 
He could have alone, or in combination \vith other acb-;, 
sounded his horn. Or he could have used the unoccu-
pied inner lane and avoided the truck. It would be 
difficult to maintain the position, that the failure of 
Plaintiff to adopt one of these possible course~ of 
action '''"as not negligence. 
In lieu of adopting one of the many reasonable 
courses of action available to him, Plaintiff chose to 
calculate what portion of the outer lane of the high-
"ray he thought the Defendant would need to turn his 
large van-type truck from its parked position onto 
Washington Blvd. Based on these mental calculations, 
Plaintiff gave a few feet of high\vay and continued on at 
a fairly rapid rate, astraddle the lane line, to,vard the 
existing hazard. 
Plaintiff testified that he gave Defendant the room 
that \Vas necessary and considered the rna tter closed 
(T-12); (T-18). 
The absurdity of Plaintiff's conduct is most appar-
ent \vhen one realizes that, at best, Plaintiff \vould come 
,vithin inches of a collision. Any visual error could make 
the difference. 
10 
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Plaintiff's conduct is in utter disregard of a very 
basic demand of the law - that a Plaintiff, aware of an 
approaching danger, must select a course of conduct rea-
sonably calculated to reduce the risk. 
ThP unoccupied lane, open to Plaintiff on the left, 
eoupled "·i th the very slow speed of the Defendant's 
trurk, suggest that Plaintiff's decision to remain in the 
immedintely threatened lane of traffic is so below the 
standard of care, required by the law, and the solution is 
so devoid of possible benefits to be derived from this so-
lution, that such conduct must be considered negligence 
ns a matter of la.\v. 
In Farrell v. Cameron, 98 Utah 69, 94 P. 2d 1068, 
this Court held that a driver, who was alerted to the 
other motorist's peril in an approaching car, slightly 
o\·er the center line, was negligent as a matter of law for 
failing to turn slightly and thereby avoid a collision. If 
it is negligence to refuse to avoid a vehicle that intrudes 
onto the wrong side of the highway, it would surely be 
negligence where, as here, a driver elects to remain on 
a collision course, w·hen an adjacent, safe lane is available. 
This Court has also held that parties cannot insist on 
right of way as an absolute (Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, \ 
98 P. 2d 350) or on a position or course of travel as an 
absolute. (Farrell Y. Cameron, supra). 
To allow an alerted motorist the right to continue a 
course of travel that forseeably may intersect the course 
traveled by a Defendant 'vho is unaware of the Plaintiff's 
11 
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presence, would be to allow gambling in lives, and encour-
age tests of skill in shaving danger. 
Defendant further submits that Plaintiff violatPd 
the provision of Section 41-6-35, U.C.A. 1953 and is there-
fore guilty of negligence as a matter of la,Y, in that ob-
serving a vehicle occupying the outside lane, even thong'h 
at an angle, Plaintiff would be required to pass on the 
left a.t a safe distance. 
Defendant further submits that Plaintiff should be 
held to be guilty of ~egligence as a matter of la\Y in that 
he failed to sound his horn. Section 41-6-146, U.C.A. 
1953 requires the sounding of a horn in those situatioll:--i 
"\vhere it is ''reasonably necessary to insure safe opera-
tion.'' The case at hand would seem to be the very typP 
of fact situation \Yhich the framers of the Statute had in 
mind. If the Plaintiff had sounded his horn when he \Yas 
first alerted to the danger, there is a good possibility that 
the collision would have been avoided. The use of the 
horn in a situation such as presented here would seem to 
be even more imperative \Yhere a driver rather than 
going around the danger goes, instead, to its very· edge. 
In determining the issues presented by this AppeaL 
it should be noted that the Court in the past has clearly 
differentiated hct\Yeen t\YO types of traffic situations. 
The first is "\Vhere the Plaintiff faces a complex situa-
tion involving several vehicles "'"hich require the Plain-
tiff to divide his attention between these several Ye-
hicles. The Court has referred to this as "multiple 
12 
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nppraist•nleut. '' ThP second traffic situation is the non-
complPx or simph~ situation \Yht•rc the Plaintiff is con-
t'rouh•d \rith a single Yehicle and his attention can be 
fo('ust•d almost e:xelusi Yely on such vehicle. (See C' or-
·in.qfou , .. (--.o rpenfer, -t. Utah ~d 378, 294 P. 2d 788; and 
Smith , .. Ban.netf, 1 Utah 2d 224, 265 P. 2d 407.) 
This classification has been used by the Court not 
mcrl'ly as a. device to characterize a particular circum-
stanee, but also as a basis for deciding whether a. driv-
l'r's conduct amounted to negligence as a matter of la''?· 
lTndoubtedly this classification was not intended to apply 
n mechanical rule to all cases that fit the description of 
either category. 
The Court's theory appears to be based on the notion 
that gi,·en a complex choice it would usually be left to 
the trier of fact to determine whether the alternative 
chosen \vas rea.sona ble and will seldom be considered a 
math'r of law. On the other hand, given a driYer con-
fronted "·ith only one vehicle, the conduct of such a driver 
,·cry often, though not always, lk'nds itself to judicial de-
termination as a matter of la"\ 
This appeal presents a case w·hich is a very uncompli-
eated traffic situation. The hazard is readily apparent, a 
~lo\v-moving truck 'vith a driver apparently heedless to 
Plaintiff's presence. The alternatiYes on the part of the 
oncoming driYer are simple. 
This case is strikingly similar in the basic traffic sit-
uation as that in the Co ~·ington Case "There the distinc-
13 
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